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IN THE .SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
C. A. DAVIS, dha C. A. DAVIS C·O.,
and CHARLES MONT MAHONEY,
STANFORD MAHONEY, and J. J
MAHONEY, dba R.ed Cedar Mill
C·ompany, a copartnership,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
1
•

Case No. 8148

-vs.LAVELL KEMP ~and BRYCE
CHENEY, dba Lost River Sawmill
Company, a copartnership,
Defendamts and Appellants.
APPELLANT'S. BRIEF
STATEMENT OF· F·ACTS
The plaintiffs, Mahoney and C. A. Davis, brought
this action to recover $1,600.00 lent to the defendant R·ed
Cedar Mill Company, a partnership, on September 26,
1950. The defendant, LaVeil Kemp, filed an answer alleging that there had been a novation between the plaintiffs, the defendants, and one G. E. Blackburn.
The defendant ~also set up a counterclaim against
the plaintiffs for conversion of a caterpillar tractor, re-
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suiting in the destruction of the busines~ sold to Blackburn and the resultant loss to the defendants of their
contract with Blackburn.
The defendant appeals solely from the judgment of
the Court 'as it relates to the plaintiffs' complaint and
consequently will limit his statement of facts and argument to the judgrnent rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
on their complaint.
In the midd,le part of September, 1950, the plaintiffs were operating a planing mill in Salt Lake City,
Utah. At that time they were having considerable difficulty obtaining rough-cut lumber for their pl,aning mill.
( Tr. p~. 11-12.)
They learned of the fact that Kemp and Cheney
were operating a mill in Idaho, and they went there to
see whether or not they could tie up, the defendants' production of rough-cut lumber. The trucker who had advised them of Kemp's operation also told them that Kemp
needed money to purchase a larger tractor to handle the
logs needed for his saWinill operation. The plaintiff'S saw
an opportunity here to obtain an additional source of
lumber to supply their customers and immediately called
Kemp on the telephone and discussed with him the possibility of lending money to the partnership· in exchange
for an agreement to supply them with lumber. It was
subsequently agreed between the defendant partnership.
and the pl'aintiffs that the plaintiffs would lend $2,000.00
to the defendants to purchase the tractor 'and that the
defendants would deliver to the plaintiffs lumber in pay2
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ment of this obligation. The amount of the loan was to
be repaid within sixty days from the 26th of September,
1950. The partnership was able to pay $287.00 on the
obligation. The plaintiffs actually only delivered $1600.00
of the $2,000.00 they had agreed to lend the defendants
and there was consequently due $1,313.00 on November,
1950. Due to difficulties the defendants were unable to
produce and deliver the lumber n:s agreed, and in the
fall of 1950 the defendants decided to dissolve their partnership, and it was agreed between them that the defendant Kemp would wind up the business and obtain ~a purchaser. In the winter of 1951 defendant Kemp obtained 'a
prospective purchaser in the person of G. E. Blackburn,
who agreed to purchase the sawmill and equipment; and
on the 8th of June, 1951, Kemp and Blackburn made a
memorandum of their ;agreement. (Exhibit 8)
The plaintiffs were then advised by Kemp that he,
had sold the business to Blackburn and that Blackburn
had assumed the obligations and would make arrangements to pay them. In the summer of 1951 Blackburn
was unable to set the mill in operation because of the
fact that the plaintiffs had removed the tractor and
secreted it in an equipment yard in Salt Lake City. The
season was spent in attempting to locate this tractor.
Blackburn inquired of the plaintiff Mahoney, who had
taken the tractor fro1n Mack ay, Idaho, whether or not he
knew \vhere the tractor was, and Mahoney denied having
any knowledge of where the tractor was.
1

"Q. Mr. Blackburn came and asked you about the
tractor, wliere it was, didn't he~
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A.

He did.

Q.

And you told him you didn't lrnow where it
was, didn't you~

A.

That's right. I felt he had no right, no re'ason
to inquire.

Q.

You told him you had never seen any such
tractor, isn't that right~

A.

I told him I didn't know where it was.

Q. You did know where it was, didn't

you~

A. Yes, I did." (Tr. 56-57)
The tractor was not located by Blackburn until after
the season was over; consequently, the business produced
no lumber during the summer of 1951. In ApTil of 1952
the defendant Kemp invited Mr. Blackburn and the plaintiffs to ·his home to discuss the n1atter of the obligation
and to make sure that there would be no further liability
on his part. At tbis meeting the plaintiffs were again
advised that Blackburn had purchased the busines'S and
assumed the obligations, and the plaintiffs entered into
a new agreement with Blackbur11 to pay the obligation by
delivering to them 17,000 feet of lu1nber. They granted
Blackburn until June to deliver this lumber in satisfaction of the debt. Thereafter, "\vithout any notice to Kemp,
they extended the obligation for another month. Blackburn, because of technical difficulties, was unable to
deliver the lu1nber as agreed; and in the winter of 1952
died in an aircraft accident. No attempt was m·ade to
collect this obligation from Kemp until after the de·ath
of Blackburn.
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The lower court found in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant and entered judgment on the plaintiffs' complaint in the amount of $1556.11, and it is from
this judgment that the defendant, Lavell Kemp, appeals.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT LAVELL KEMP WAS DISCHARGED
FROM LIABILITY ON THE P ARTNER.SHIP DEBT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT LAVELL KEMP WAS DISCHARGED
FROM LIABILITY ON THE PARTNERSHIP DEBT.

At Corrrrnon Law a retiring p'artner was never discharged from a partnership obligation unless there was a
novation between himself, the new partner, and the creditor. This required an agreement between the debtor and
the person assuming the debt and also the express consent of the partneT'ship creditor to look to the person
assuming the debt for payment and would release the old
debtor from liability as an original obligor or as a surety
on the obligation.
Great confusion in the cases arose over the question
of when a novation had occurred by reason of the conduct
of the parties, 'and what conduct indicates a novation and
what does not.
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Recognizing the extremely unsati·sfactory state of
the law, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform L~aws approved a provision in the Uniform
Partnership Act which atte1npts to solve the problem of
when 'a novation occurs and the old debtor is discharged.
This Act was passed by the Legislature of Utah, and the
pertinent ~section dealing with the problem of the dis~
charge of a former partner from liability for partnership
debts· reads as follows :
"Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partnership·, the
partners whose obligations have been a;ssumed
shall he discharged from any liability to MY creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the 'agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of pay1nent of such obligations." (481-33 (3) Utah Code Annotated 1953)
With this controlling statute in mind, let us see if
the facts of this case are such that the defendant was discharged from liability on the partnership· debt. There
are four elements in this statute:
1.

That the partnership be dissolved.

2. That so1ne one agrees to assume the debts
of the p.artnership·.
That the creditor know of this agreement
to assume the debts of the partnership, and
3.

4. That the creditor consents to a material
alteration in the nature or time of p-ayment of such
debt.
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All of these elements are present in this ease, and the
defendant, Kemp, was therefore discharged of liability
on the partnership debt to the plaintiffs. Let us examine
the record.
The defendant, Kemp, testified that the partnership
was dis~solved in the winter of 1950:

"Q. All right. Now in the winter of 1950 did you
·and your partner, Bryce Cheney, dissolve this
partnership·?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q.

And did you agree. to wind it up and get a
sale for the business~

A.

That's right. I was to find a sale for it."
(Tr. 83, 84)

The loan was 1nade in the summer of 1950 nnd was
an existing debt of the partnership at the: time of dissolution.
The defendant, Kemp, did obtain a buyer for the
business in the person of Garth E. Blackburn of Logan,
Utah, who agreed to assume and pay the partnership
debts. Kemp testified as follows:

"Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Did you find a sale for it?
I did.
And who agreed to buy the business~
Garth E. Blackburn from Logan.
What was he to pay you for the business?
Fifty-five hundred dollars, fifty-three hundred dollars.
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Q. And was he to. assume the obligations of the
business~

A.

Q.

Yes, that's right.
* • •
He agreed to assume the obligations of the
business~

A.

T·hat's right. I told him of the obligation's,
who I owed money to and told him that I
didn't want a thing out of it until these obligations were all paid and he agreed to pay
them." (Tr. 84)

The fact of the sale to Blackburn and of his agree·ment to assume the partnership debts was made known
to the plaintiffs by Kemp. In the sp·ring of 1952 the defendant, Kemp, invited the plaintiffs and Garth Blackburn to his. home for the purpose of making certain that
all parties understood about the sale to Blackburn and
that Blackburn was to pay off the partnership debts.
Charles (Mont) Mahoney, Carl Davis, Garth Blackburn,
and Kemp were all present. There ·all the· facts were
placed before the plaintiffs, and they agreed to accept
p'ayment from Blackburn, who was to pay the de·bt by
delivering lumber to the plaintiffs.

"A. I told them that the mill had been sold and
that they had been after me to pay the obligation. They wanted lumber. I told them I
was out of the lrunber business. I had been
and they knew it before that. I wanted them
all there and have him, have it fixed 'SO Mr.
Blackburn would take over the obligation and
p·ay it off beeause I couldn't supply any more
lumber.
8
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Q. And was this suggestion agreeable with them~
A. Yes Sir." ( Tr. 84-85)
* • •
"Q. What did Blackburn say~
A. He said he would p·ay it off.
Q. How~
A. By lumber, seventeen thousand feet, I think,
was the exact amount ...
Q. And what did Mr. Mahoney and Mr. Davis
say regarding this seventeen hundred feet of
lumber~

A.

Well they agreed, tliey agreed that that was
what they said then. In other words, they
said that that was satisfactory with them
and that if he went ahead and paid it off.

Q. Now did you advise them that your expected
to be released from the obligation~
A.

I sure did. That was one thing that was
stressed very strictly and I told them that this

obligation after this meeting and that was
the object of the meeting and I think they all
knew it." (Tr. 86-87)
* * *
"Q. And did they say whether or not they would
release you~
A. Yes, they did.
Q. Did they say they would or would not~
A. They said they would in order to get the
lumber. I was out of the lumber business and
I told them I was out of the lumber business,
I couldn't support them or supply them with
any lun1ber and they wanted lumber. That
was what they were in teres ted in, to keep
their mill going." ( Tr. 87)
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The final element of the statute is that the creditor,
after learning of the dissolution of the partnership and
that some one had assumed the debts of the partnership
either materially alters the nature or tim.e of p1aymer~~.t
of the debt.
There can be no question but that the pl'aintiffs in
this case consented to both a material alteration the nature of the payment to be made -and also extended and
changed the- time of p~ayment.
The loan was made to the Lost River Sawmill Company in the middle of September 1950. (Tr. 13) The loan
was to be repaid within sixty days. At the time the plaintiffs met at the home of the defendant, Kemp, with Mr.
Blackburn to discuS's the payment of the loan, it wa;s already more tha;n. a ye:ar past d1~te! (Tr. 84)
After discussing the sale to Blackburn and the
method of Blackburn's pa;ying this obligation, they made
an entirely new 'arrangement with Blackburn under the
terms of which it was agreed that Blackburn would deliver to their mill seventeen thousand feet of lumber,
and the plaintiffs would consider the debt p~aid.
The original obligation called for payment by delivering lumber to be paid for one half in cash and one
half in lumber credited on the obligation. The original
amount of credit allowed on the obligation was $.55.00 per
1,000 feet of lumber delivered. (See Exhibit 5) The nature of pay1nent was materially changed in the: new agreement with Blackburn. .
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After some discussion and bargaining the plaintiffs
agreed to take 17,000 feet of lumber in satisfaction of the
obligation plus interest. The oblig·ation then amounted to
$1,313.22 principal and legal interest in the amount of
approximately $124.71. This would leave a total balance
of $1,437.93. They thus agreed with Blackburn to credit
the account at the rate of $84.58 per 1,000 feet instead of
$55.00 per 1,000 feet as they had heretofore agreed with
Kemp and Cheney.
Not only was the nature of p'ayment changed in the

new agreement with Blackburn, the new owner of the
business, but the time of payment was materially changed.
At the time of the meeting at the Kemp house, the account was already more than a year past due. The plaintiffs made a new agreement to take lumber in p'ayment
and extende·d the obligation to June of 1952. Carl A.
Davis, one of the joint venturers in the plan to tie up
Lost River Sawmill Lumber, testified 'as follows:
BY MR. HYDE:

"Q. Mr. Davis,. referring to this meeting at Mr.
Kemp's home in the spring of 1952 and Mont
M·alloney and Mr. Kemp and Mr. Blackburn
were present, do you know the occasion that
I am referring to~
A. Yes.

Q. Did Mr. Kemp advise you of the dissolution
of their partnership and of the S'ale of the
business to Mr. Blackburn~
A.

I had been advised of the dissolution of the
partnership some time prior to this.
11
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Q. Oh, you had been~
A. I had.
Q. And the matter was discussed of the sale to
Mr. Blackburn, is that true~
A. Comments were made about it. I don't think
there was much of a discussion entered into.
Q. Well you were aware of it, were you not~
A. Yes.
Q. Now this obligation was due and payable at
the time of the n1eeting, wasn't it~
A. Yes.
Q. And do you concur with what Mr. Mahoney
'has testified about, about the extension of the
obligation until June of that year to allow
Mr. Blackburn to get the 'seventeen thousand
feet of lumber down to you~
A. Yes.
Q. And then it was re-extended until JUly~
A. Yes.
Q. Now the agreement you had with Mr. Kemp
and Mr. Cheney was that payment would be
made only half in lumber, isn't that true~
Half of the lumber delivered~
A. Ye:s.
Q. And the agreement 1nade with Mr. Blackburn
was that no cash would be paid for the lumber; all of the lumber would apply on the
obligation, is that true~
A.

That's right.

Q.

Now when was the second agreement in default~ I refer to the agreement for Blackburn to deliver the lumber~
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A.

Well Mr. Blackburn agreed with Mr. Kemp
that he would bring down two loads of lumber in equal amounts of eighty-five hundred
feet. That was the capacity he could haul
in his truck and the first load to have been
delivered in May, approximately the 15th,
and the second load approximately a month
later and they weren't forthcoming, two loads
instead of one." (Tr. 76-77)

We consequently have not only one extension of the
obligation to June, 1952, but a later extension that Kemp
had no knowledge of to July, 1952.
One of the leading cases under the provision of the
Partnership Act which bears on the case before this
Court is the case of Lenger v. Hulst, 244 N.W. 187; 259
Mich. 640. In that case the plaintiff creditor made a loan
to a partnership during the time when the defendant
Hulst was a partner. Hulst later sold his interest in the
partners·hip to one Hollemans.
At the time of this sale Hulst notified the plaintiff
that he was selling to Hollemans. The plaintiff formally
notified Hulst that this would not release him from the
obligation. In answer to the letter from Hulst notifying
them that he had sold out to Hollemans, they replied by
return mail :

"In reply to the notice ... we wish to go on
record to the effect that this company does not
intend to release either of the partners ... from
the joint and several liability which they now have
... to the undersigned company ... "
Lenger v. Hulst, 244 N.W. 187 at p. 188.
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The lower court held that because of this notice of
their intention to hold Hulst after notice of the sale that
there was no novation and Hulst was therefore not discharged by the sale to Hollemans. The Supreme Court
of Michigan reversed the trial court and held that Hulst
was discharged regardless of the intention of the plaintiffs not to release him from his liability on the obligation. In reversing the lower court and entering judgment
for the defendant, the court discus'Sed at length the argument made successfully to the tr±al court that the defendant is not discharged unle'Ss the plaintiff agreed or
intended such a result. They said:
"We think it cannot be held that the plaintiff,
by seTving the· quoted notice, could avoid the express statutory provision. Neither dissolution of
the p'artnership nor the assumption of the partnership obligations by Hollemans released defendant from liability on partnership debts; but he
was released, when, without his consent or acquie'Scence in any way, plaintiffs by renewals of
each of these notes. extended the time within which
the obligations were payable and could be enforced, OJYI;,d in this m.anner ma,terially altere,d
the nature of the obligation . .. until plaintiff voluntarily extended the time within which each of
these notes were payable., payment could have
been enforced against defendant. Plaintiffs were
charged with knowledge of the law, 'and, if they
saw fit to grant to Hollemans an extension of time
within which p·ayment could be made without obtaining defendant's consent or acquiescence in any
way, they did so subject to the provision'S of the
quoted statute and thereby discharged the defendant from his former obligation."
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Lenger v. Hulst, 244 N.W. 187 at p. 188.
In the case before this Court, no notice of intention
to hold Kemp was given. Ken1p called the meeting for
the express purpose of clarifying the picture and of m'aking certain that the partnership creditors and the purchaser of the busine'ss (Blackburn) had 1nade satisfactory
arrangen1ents to take care of the pay1nen t of this obligation. The plaintiffs could have refused to extend or
alter the ter1ns of the obligation and have sued Kemp
at tliat time.. They chose to 1nake a new agreement with
Blackburn because they wanted lumber more than they
wanted the money. They extended the obligation twice to
allow Blackburn to deliver the lumber. Blackburn wa:s
unable to get the lumber out that summer. Not until after
Blackburn had died the following 'v}nter did the plaintiffs decide to pursue the old partners.

CONCLUSION
The evidence given by the pl'aintiffs the1nselve'S conclusively shows tltat:
1. The defendant partnership was dissolved after
the loan was made in Septe1nber, 1950.
2. The business was sold to G. E. Blackburn who
assumed the debts of the partnership.
3. The plaintiffs knew of this arrangement and
thereafter consented to a material alteration in the nature and time of payment of the obligation.
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The result of their so doing is that the defendant
Kemp was discharged from liability on the old partnership debt and the judgment of the lower court was in.
error and should be reversed.
Respe.ctfully submitted,

MOSS & HYDE
By --------------------------------------- -~-- ----------Attorneys for Defendants ood
A ppellaJYbt, LaVell Kemp
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